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ABSTRACT
Traditionally large cities had also concentrated significant economic, social and
demographic power due to economies of agglomeration. This article presents a hypo-
thesis about modification of these economies by new technologies of information and
communication, which change spatial coordinates and diminish the role of distance.
This paper presents an economic analysis of residential location of economic
agents, with a special attention paid to urban dispersion. The paper derives the attrac-
tiveness of a city as the function of its population and studies the equilibrium split of
population across cities. The main goal is to explain price formation and urban dis-
persion through production structure and wages determined by sizes and relative
location of cities. The results show that different neighbouring municipalities beco-
me economically interrelated, and we need to shift our attention to a new spatial
object of analysis —functional urban areas, which is a product of spatial aggregation
of municipalities with respect to housing and labour markets. It implies also a policy
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change which should take into account this interdependence of neighbouring mar-
kets. For example, NUTS-III in the European Community should be replaced by
functional areas.
Keywords: housing prices, cities, economies of agglomeration, location choice.
JEL Classification: H22, R12; R52, H54
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this article is to develop theoretical model that allow us to determine
the spatial patterns of location of economic agents and to explain the process of resi-
dential dispersion in big cities caused by centrifugal forces.
The decentralization of productive system as the consequence of economic glo-
balization leads to an emergence of a network of big cities, which concentrate eco-
nomic power via the production of advanced services. Due to scale economies, these
cities create additional demand for labour, which attracts significant migration flows.
However, competition for space between productive and residential sectors inside
these cities leads to high land rents and housing prices in central areas, which make
them affordable only for business and services. Thus, CBD is created, while the wor-
kers have to commute with it from the periphery of the city. They locate in the so
called functional area of the city and commute to the CBD as the place of their work.
With an increase in technical possibilities to commute, the functional area is growing,
and counter-urbanization is taking place. Berry (1976) was the first to describe this
process of economic and demographic reverse of flows in big metropolitan areas in
favour to periphery in the last decades of the 20th century.
In order to explain these processes we start from a theoretical model, which deter-
mines an optimal population for a city and equilibrium partition of population across
two cities, or municipalities. We also study a comparative statics of this equilibrium
with respect to external shocks.
1.1. Observation and Hypothesis
During the 19th and 20th centuries the process of urbanization was taking place;
economic activity and population were concentrating in big cities. But later this cen-
tral city became less concentrated, forming with its growing periphery a big city-
region.
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1 Of course, not all price rise was justified by this reason, bubbles also occurred. Annual
appreciation of 15-30%, typical for Moscow, Barcelona and other cities in 2002,2003,2004 and
2005 cannot be explained by purely employment factor, but also contain an element of portfo-
lio choice when financial markets are downward sloping.
Why has this happened?
Due to the reduction of centripetal forces in favour of centrifugal. New transpor-
tation and communication technologies have reduced the benefits from agglomera-
tion and thus have changed spatial coordinates. Mobility became less expensive and
now takes less time. This has increased the potential distance of commuting for wor-
kers.
But transportation of goods also became less expensive, while the cost of infor-
mation delivery depends very little on distance. This leads to globalization, but we
will not focus on long-distance (inter-country) effects in this study.
2. RELATION BETWEEN RESIDENTIAL AND LABOUR MARKETS
2.1. Agglomeration and externalities
Traditionally, the process of urbanization and agglomeration was explained from
the point of view of urban economics, which have been derived in 1970ies (Hender-
son, 1974) on the basis of pioneering work of Alonso (1964).
The recent studies in the field of new economic geography were summarized in
the book of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999): they explain the dynamics of
urban hierarchy through an interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces.
And there were practically no attempts to link together these approaches, in order
to determine the relation, which exists between labour and housing markets. Tabuchi
(1998) proposes a possibility of synthesis between Alonso and Krugman, or between
urban agglomeration and dispersion. This paper attempts to follow this objective.
Let us consider the economies of agglomeration, which make large urban areas
an attractor of population during the last decades. The global evolution of employ-
ment served as a positive shock for housing demand, especially in city centres, whe-
re real estate prices have been growing above the general level of inflation1. If we
follow the classification of Glaeser et al (2001) of external and agglomeration eco-
nomies, we can tell that externalities of Jacobs type (diversification as an engine of
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innovation) are more relevant for large cities, while externalities of Marshall-Arrow-
Romer type (related to specialization) represent a property of smaller cities.
That is why, advanced technologies and labour of high quality are attracted by
dominant cities of the highest hierarchy. The reason is that research and development
activity exhibits both higher fixed costs and associated economies of scale, which can
break even only in urban agglomeration of a significant size. Big cities also possess
the necessary infrastructure, qualified labour market and proximity to other activities.
Thus, the process of growth of large urban areas becomes self-reinforcing.
On the other hand, if a firm operates under standard technology, it might also
require a location in a city above some threshold size, due to scale economies, but the
optimal city size for this productive activity will be less, since it may be unable to
extract additional benefits in a large city that would compensate higher land rents.
In the city of the highest hierarchic level, we observe a vicious cycle: higher spe-
cialization, higher salary, expansion of employment, higher residential demand for
land and higher prices for real estate. As a result, we observe both expansion and spa-
tial dispersion of large cities.
2.2. Alternative explanation
Following Lopez Garcia (1992), the housing price reflects the characteristics of
demand and supply through the supply of land, income level of population, interest
rate, tax laws, etc. But these factors might not explain the differences of housing pri-
ces across municipalities and the differences in the growth rates of prices across
them. In order to explain these differences, we need to introduce the spatial structu-
re of an effective demand and to derive the potential of these municipalities from the
following points of view:
• demand for space by productive capital,
• population mobility inside functional area due to the process of adjustment of
residential preferences,
• net migration received by the considered functional area.
This effective demand is responsible for urban hierarchy, size of municipalities
and spatial dynamics of the functional area. Reassignment of population and capital
across locations in the process of this dynamics implies also an evolution of housing
prices.
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New technologies of communication and information change the spatial coordi-
nates and allow populating areas more distant from the CBD. This reduces the bene-
fits from agglomeration for a significant fraction of population and business. At the
same time, the changes in organizational structure of firms reinforce the attractive-
ness of central city and diminish the attractiveness of the regions on a periphery.
All these factors and processes define the position of cities and municipalities in
urban hierarchy and the level of attractiveness. The structure of residential market
corresponds to monopolistic competition, where each location has its particular cha-
racteristics and thus represents a local partial monopoly.
3. THEORETICAL MODEL
We would like to have a theoretical basis for the competition between municipa-
lities for labour force, which describes the flows of migration from the municipalities
with lower benefits per capita to those with higher benefits. These flows exist since
agents can participate in spatial arbitrage, voting by foot, like in Tiebout model. We
also would like to see how external shock changes the equilibrium allocation of
labour. While the empirical model for Barcelona functional area will be formulated
for many municipalities, it makes sense to start with a simple theoretical model that
can predict an equilibrium pattern of labour allocation across two cities.
Our theoretical model includes a highly stylized equilibrium story for an optimal
city size, in the spirit of model of Henderson (1974). Then we suggest an economic
explanation for commuting.
• Assumptions:
1. There exist two cities (1,2) and N identical agents, facing a binary choice: to
live in city 1 or in city 2.
2. Every city i produces some benefits B(i) that attract agents, but to live in a city
they have to pay city-specific costs C(i). For simplicity, we assume that bene-
fits are derived from wages, while costs are related to housing prices. All other
factors (ecology, climate, etc) can be counted as location-specific factors, that
perturb initially symmetric model. Attractiveness of a city is the difference bet-
ween benefits and costs: V(i)=B(i)-C(i). The flow of migrants is proportional
to the differential in attractiveness between cities i and j: F(ij) = ? (V(j)-V(i)).
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3. Every city has an industry with Leontief-type technology Q = min {K, L}
(here K denotes capital and L-labour) and fixed costs F. The markets for capi-
tal and industrial product are perfectly competitive, with r being the price of
capital, and p being the price of final good. The wage w depends on number
of workers and thus depends on city size. We further assume that all popula-
tion of the city is employed in this industry.
4. Every city has a radially symmetric structure with constant population density
?, CBD in its centre and internal transport costs linear in distance. Thus agents
who live at its periphery are compensated for transport costs by lower location
rent and housing price.
• A Model of Optimal City
We will first derive how wage depends on city size, and then will find the rela-
tionship between city size and housing price. Thus, we will obtain the attractiveness
of a city as a function of its population.
• How does the wage depend on city size?
We assume that each city has a firm which operates with zero profit (monopolis-
tic competitive environment). Thus, the benefits from sales should cover fixed costs
and the rest should be split across labour and capital. For Leontieff production func-
tion, it is optimal to operate with equal size of inputs; hence, Q = K = L. Now we will
rely on a stylized fact of perfect capital and imperfect labour mobility. Due to perfect
competition in financial markets and perfect capital mobility, every unit of capital
receives the same return r, while labour can get different returns in different cities.
Hence, we get pL = (w+r) L + F. Since L=N(i), the expression for the wage is the
following:
w(i) = p - r – F/N(i) (1)
In fact, the wage depends on city size only, w(N) = C - F/N. This function is con-
cave in N: w’>0, w’’<0. Very small cities simply cannot exist (wage should be nega-
tive), while for very large cities the wage approaches its upper limit: w(∞)=C.
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• Housing price and city size
Consider a city as monocentric CBD, with r as the distance from the city centre
(Alonso model). For simplicity, we assume linear transport cost and will abstract
from distance effect on dwelling size as well as on the height of the buildings.
The housing price, Ph, is assumed to be a linear function of location rent R(r):
Ph(r) = R(r) + H
where H denotes construction cost, equal for all locations.
At the edge of the city, the location rent is equal to agricultural rent Ra, which is
assumed to be a constant, independently on location. Then, the location rent in the
centre R(0) = Ra + t r*, where t is unit distance transport cost. Assume that a city has
a radius r*. Then its population equals to N = ?π (r*)2.
Hence, r* = √N/(?π). The housing price in city centre, Ph(0) = Ra +H + t r*. It will
be considered as housing price index, or cost of living, for the whole city: P(i) = Ph(0).
The reason is that only the residents in this point do not face transport cost, and this
price exactly equals the sum of housing rental price plus internal transport cost for
the whole city. This cost of living in a city contains a term proportional to a square
root of its population:
P(i)= a + b √N(i) (2)
It is also concave in N, but the shape differs from w(N).
Now we can write a formula for city attractiveness:
V(i) = w(i) – P(i) = p - r - a – F/N(i) – b √N(i) (3)
The shape of attractiveness reminds one in the model of Henderson (1974): the-
re exists a unique optimal city size. We can differentiate the formula (3) w.r.t. N(i) to
find an optimal city size. The f.o.c. leads to the following expression:
2 F √N = b N2, or 4F2 = b2 N3
The last equation has a unique positive root, N*=(2F/b)2/3. At this level of N*, the
second derivative is negative, V’’ = - 3 b2/(8F) < 0, and we really have a maximum.
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Proposition 1: Under assumptions 1-4, both wages and housing prices positi-
vely depend on city size. However, an interplay between these factors leads to a uni-
que optimal city size, which creates the highest attractiveness for its citizens. Hence,
the potential of city attractiveness has an inversed U-shape. First, the attractiveness
increases with population growth, and then declines. It is the result of interplay bet-
ween centripetal forces (due to economies of scale) and centrifugal forces (expulsion
due to high residential prices caused by competition for scarce land in a city).
3.1. Comparative statics of an equilibrium
It is easy to show that ∂N*/∂b<0 and ∂N*/∂F>0. Thus, a decline in transportation
cost b results in an increase of optimal city size. Perhaps, this is the reason of conti-
nuous growth of urban centres, especially in less developed countries (Mexico city,
Bombay, San Paolo, etc). On the other hand, an increase in fixed costs F leads to an
increase of city size. Another consequence of the uniqueness of optimal city size is
the shape of attractiveness V(N): it starts as convex (IRS) function, and continues as
concave (DRS) function.
However, if all population N has to be split across two cities, there is little chan-
ce that both cities can have optimal sizes. This question will be analyzed in the next
subsection.
Gráfico 1. Optimal city size
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• Competition between Two Cities for Labour: Two Types of Equilibrium
3.2. Stable equilibrium
If we have to split all population N across two cities, the result depends on this
N. Assume first, that cities are symmetric. If N>2N*, the curves intersect in the area
of decreasing returns (every additional citizen negatively contributes to the utility of
the rest). This equilibrium is stable (see Fig.2). Imagine that initial split of population
is different from this equilibrium allocation. Then, according to assumption 2, the dif-
ference between potentials of attractiveness will create a flow of migrants from less
attractive to more attractive city. This difference will continuously decline, until it
fully disappears.
Gráfico 2. Equilibrium split of population between two cities
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2 We cannot prove the theorem of uniqueness, there might be multiplicity of equilibria.
• Unstable equilibrium
On the other hand, if N<2N*, two curves intersect on IRS parts (Fig. 3). This
equilibrium is unstable. Consider initial allocation different from equilibrium. If a
marginal worker moves from less to more attractive city, the attractiveness of less
attractive city drops even more, while for more attractive city it increases further.
Thus, any deviation from equilibrium will be self-reinforcing. In fact, cities fight for
additional workers in this case. While this is an interesting case, which may explain
why historically not all cities were growing, but some of them ended in a decline, we
will not focus on elaboration of these ideas in this paper.
While our formal analysis is provided for the system of two cities (municipali-
ties), the results can be applied for a functional area of more complex structure. We
can infer that there exists an optimal spatial distribution of population and capital2.
Gráfico 3. Unstable equilibrium
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3.3. Extension of the Model
In reality, we have more than two cities. Also, not only direct benefits derived
from wages and costs related to housing prices define the decisions of agents to loca-
te in a particular city. There are also geographical factors (climate, beautiful views,
sea, mountain, forest, lake, etc) that affect their decisions. Since we cannot model the
influence of these factors in an explicit form, we demote them as Q. Since we have n
different locations (cities, functional area or municipalities), we get n different utili-
ties U(i) that an agent can obtain:
U(i)=U(V(i),Q(i)), i=1,2,…,n,
where V(i) is defined by formula (3) and depends on salary and housing price,
which both depend on city size N(i) (through capital, infrastructure and other econo-
mic factors and externalities). Note, that we can have U(i)=U(j), when N(i)≠N(j).
Hence, the introduction of geographic factors allows explaining the difference in
sizes of the cities (otherwise, all cities would have a unique optimal size).
Until now, we have been working with a static microeconomic model, and now
we turn to its dynamic generalization. The static model formally corresponds to a
short run horizon, where capital stock is fixed and geographic factors are static. We
have seen that location economic net benefits V(i) are determined only by city popu-
lation N(i). We can generalize the equilibrium theory, which was developed before
for 2 cities without geographic externalities, for the case of n cities.
• Equilibrium conditions.
Let N(i) denotes the population of our city i, while N(j) represents the popula-
tions in the rest of locations. Then we have a stable equilibrium allocation of the
population between all locations, if for every agent k from location i the following
conditions hold:
1) Uk(V(N(i)), Q(i)) ≥ Uk(V(N(j)), Q(j)), for all k from i,
2) Uk(V(N(i)+1, Q(i))≤Uk(V(N(j)), Q(j)), for all j ≠ i,
3) N(i)+ ∑ N(j)=N.
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3 In fact, they may differ not only in income, but also in geographic preferences. Then we
are no longer in the environment of the assumptions of our model.
In other words, equilibrium allocation is stable if every agent locating in city i is
not better off by moving to other location. Since agents in our model are assumed to
be identical3, there is no difference between utility of every citizen k in a particular
city i, but only across cities, and this simplifies analysis. Besides, if additional agent
will come to this location i, the utility of her (and the rest of citizens via externality
effect) will decline. By this reason, we always have population above optimal level
in equilibrium. But if it is below, nothing can stop a city from further growth before
it reaches an optimal level. Alternatively, it can become depopulated. In this case, we
have unstable equilibrium, which was considered before.
In order to study the dynamics in the middle run, we introduce the effect of
shocks on the structure of equilibrium.
• Effects of Shocks
Consider the effect of a shock on equilibrium allocation, in the case of stable
equilibrium. Assume that a positive shock results in a multiplication of attractiveness
of city i by some factor β>1. Thus, new attractiveness for city i is given by
V*(N(i))=βV(N(i)), while for cities j≠i it stays at the old level. Now the curves will
intersect in a new point, and equilibrium will shift. The dynamics of process is also
clear: after the shock there exists a difference between cities i and j in attractiveness,
and it drives migration, until new equilibrium is achieved. Similarly, an effect of
negative shock can be considered.
While traditionally economists think in the terms of demand or supply shocks, we
find it convenient to introduce also internal and external shocks, from the point of
view of location i. Further on, we assume that internal shocks are those which shift
the schedule of the curve U(i), either affecting economic costs or benefits in this loca-
tion, or perturbing geographic attractivity. Equilibrium can also be affected if nothing
happens in municipality i, but occurs to municipality j.
How the change of spatial coordinates (caused by technological progress in trans-
portation) will affect the equilibrium split of population? What will be the impact of
particular projects and policies on this split?
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What is the effect of additional stock of migrants arriving to some municipality?
This shifts the total population N and the current position of population in this muni-
cipality along the curve. On the other hand, the shapes of all curves U(i) are not affec-
ted. New equilibrium population split will thus differ from the previous. It might
involve additional re-migration. Generally, migration shock causes a decline in uti-
lity. This result can be easily shown analytically: if we have a stable equilibrium
(Fig.2), the positive shift of N causes two curves to intersect at a level with lower
value of utility. On the other hand, in the environment of unstable equilibrium (the
phase of city growth), migration inflow can be mutually beneficial.
Speaking about the case of Catalonia, we can focus on two effects. In 1960ies, its
particular municipalities have received a significant inflow of migrants from other
Spanish regions. Currently, the municipalities along Mediterranean coast have a
potential to attract retired population from European Union.
Gráfico 4. The change of population in city j from Nj to Nj’ leads to a new equilibrium N**
after re-migration. The utility level is lower
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• Internal and external shocks
Internal shocks change utility of citizens in location i. For shocks of different
nature, either the economic attractiveness can be shifted upwards (positive economic
shock) or downwards (negative shock), or geographical attractiveness can change,
due to some location externality (ecological disaster, effects of global warming, etc).
If U(i) shifts upwards, this city i becomes more attractive, and receives additional
migrants from other areas. The overall effect is likely to be positive (higher utility at
new equilibrium), although city may loose some of its short-run gains from the posi-
tive shock in the middle run.
In an integrated world, one might be affected when something happens with your
neighbour. Suppose, the curve U(j) got a downward shift due to geographic factors
(ecological disaster). Then, migrants from that area to other regions, including i,
would increase the population in i further away from its optimal level, and new uti-
lity will be lower.
3.4. Modelling of Commuting Flows
These commuting flows can never be modelled in a fully rational framework, sin-
ce then any small difference of utilities results in a shift of all the population across
locations. In fact, we deal with unobservable individual-specific variables, like the
cost of shifting, attachment to particular location, etc. As a result, the difference in
economic attractiveness across locations results only in flows of finite size, which
increase with the difference.
What are these variables, that are responsible for commuting decisions? We have
mentioned already that attractiveness is proportional to the difference between wages,
w(i), and housing prices, P(i). Hence, these two variables, should be included. Since
agents can also choose the size of their house (and we observe a difference in avera-
ge housing size across municipalities), this variable can also be explanatory.
But how to measure geographic factors? It is possible to find a proxy variable: net
migration inflow over a certain period to municipality i, MF(i). This variable captu-
res average general attractiveness of location i with respect to all other locations in its
historical perspective. This means that attractiveness could depend on time, and we
need to aggregate. While economic factors could change over time in relative terms
(for example, Barcelona city was a centre of attraction before 1980, and then began
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to loose its population, partly because of high housing prices), geographic factors are
less likely to change so rapidly. Hence, aggregation over time will filter out some eco-
nomic variable factors, while keep geographic.
Some other variables can also be responsible for commuting decision. For exam-
ple, we can observe a variable: share of labour force in industry of intermediate
goods. While all locations are able to create similar per capita employment levels in
services oriented on local population (tourism is a separate case), location of an
industrial factory creates significant amount of additional jobs (for example, SEAT in
Martorell). Thus, even if equilibrium salaries would not exhibit a premium with res-
pect to other locations, local unemployment rates would drop and labour force from
other, less favourable areas, could exploit spatial arbitrage with respect to a higher
probability of employment.
• Why do agents commute and not migrate?
If migration would be the only way to utilize spatial arbitrage for labour, it could
bring the system to the equilibrium in the long run. Since regional shocks occur from
time to time, most of the time the system is out of equilibrium. Thus, we observe
some migration and commuting flows, which will be studied later empirically. On the
other hand, positive commuting flows are also consistent with asymmetric equili-
brium. Assume that:
wi - H Pi = wj-H Pj
(here H is the size of housing), but wj >wi. Then agents have more incentive to
commute from i to j, then to migrate to j. This is a typical case of Barcelona city,
which was studied in Mascarilla and Yegorov (2002).
• Assumptions of revealed preferences in the basis of empiricals studies
Assumption: if the mobility data show that a significant per cent age of agents
live in municipality different from their work, ceteris paribus, if an individual does
not migrate closer to a place of his work, it is because she reveals her preferences
towards residential location. Thus, observing the commuting flows, we can make
conclusions about preferences for residential locations.
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Variable endogenous:
M ij-share (takes value between 0 and 1) of workers who reside in municipality i
and commute to the place of their work in community j (measures the potential of
attraction of location j for labour residing in i),
Mij = Number of commuting i → j
Workers residing in i
4. CONCLUSIONS
1. The reduction of relative weight of transport costs in economic decisions is one
of manifestations of globalization. It changes spatial coordinates and makes the effi-
cient borders across regions endogenous. Different neighbouring municipalities
become economically interrelated, and we need to shift our attention to a new spatial
object of analysis-functional urban areas, which is a product of spatial aggregation of
municipalities with respect to housing and labour markets. It implies also a policy
change which should take into account this interdependence of neighbouring mar-
kets. For example, NUTS-III in the European Community should be replaced by
functional areas.
2. The different level of land rents and housing prices in different cities can be
explained through the process of agglomeration, a self-reinforcing process driven by
externalities, which leads to changes in wages and population sizes in cities. Our the-
oretical models predicts a particular functional form for wages and housing prices
defined through the population of a city. When several cities compete for population
in this environment of externalities and scale economies, different types of equili-
brium can emerge. A stable equilibrium represents such a population split, when the-
re is no incentive for re-migration. Due to differences in geographic factors, not all
economic factors are equalized. An unstable equilibrium represents a potential for
city growth, at the expense of other cities.
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